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Abstract
Human behaviour in economic interactions has attracted an increasing amount of attention
over the last decades. The economic assumption that people would behave focusing on
their own material self-interest was proved incomplete, once the empirical evidence consis-
tently showed that many other motives may influence such behaviour. Therefore, models
that can incorporate rational decision process as well as other intervening factors are a key
issue to both understand the observations from economic experiments and to apply the les-
sons learned from them. In this paper, we incorporate the influence of emotions to the utility
function in an explicit manner, using the Ultimatum Game as a case study. Our model is
amenable to analytical study, and is connected with the Circumplex model of emotions and
with Kahneman’s two-system theory. The simplicity of the model allows to obtain predic-
tions for the offers and acceptance thresholds. We study two specific examples, when the
model parameters are distributed uniformly or normally, and show that in the latter case the
results are already qualitatively correct. Although this work can be considered as a first
approach, it includes what we believe are the main stylized facts, is able to qualitatively
reproduce experimental results in a very simple manner, and can be straightforwardly
extended to other games.
Introduction
Experimental economics [1] and, more recently, emerging fields such as neuroeconomics [2]
have led to fundamental changes in the understanding of how humans make decisions in eco-
nomic contexts. Traditionally, economic models assumed that people focus on their own mate-
rial self-interest when involved in strategic interactions, but the scientifically sound evidence
arising from experiments suggests that many other motives may influence behavior [3].
Insights into the nature of the different behaviors obtained from experiments would clearly be
relevant in many economic settings, such as consumer response, types of taxation or price for-
mation and change. To that end, formal models that incorporate a variety of motivations for
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people’s decisions are needed, in so far as they are capable to explain (and possibly predict)
how we behave under different circumstances.
Indeed, it is certainly the case that some individuals do behave in a self-regarding manner,
and therefore a theory attempting to explain human decision making should leave room for
heterogeneity [4]. On the other hand, it has been shown that theoretical approaches can work
very well at the aggregate level while performing worse at the individual level [5, 6]. Therefore,
models that can incorporate rational decision process as well as other intervening factors are a
key issue to both understand the observations from economic experiments and to apply the les-
sons learned from them. Two main types of models have been proposed so far: one based on
bounded rationality ideas, i.e., that the cognitive capabilities of individuals are limited and ren-
der them unable to compute their best option (see, e.g., [7, 8]), and an alternative one incorpo-
rating social preferences to rational considerations (such as reciprocity [9], inequity aversion
[10] or several factors at a time [11]; see also [3] for a comprehensive review).
In this paper, we introduce a new approach to this issue by incorporating emotions to the
utility function in an explicit manner, using the Ultimatum Game (UG) as a case study. We
choose this specific application because of the wealth of experimental results about it [3] and of
the well established fact that many people do not play this game in a material self-interested
manner, which makes it a very appropriate testbed for approaches beyond monetary utility. In
the UG a fixed amount of money is split between two players: a proposer (P1) and a responder
(P2). P1 decides what the actual split is and P2 determines whether it is accepted (and both
players share the money as agreed) or rejected (and both players receive nothing). When the
game is analyzed from the perspective of classical game theory, three simple assumptions are
generally made on the behaviour of the players and their ability to find rational solutions
according to their preferences [12]:
• A1: Players behave as income-maximizers, and therefore they prefer α to β whenever α> β
(and they are indifferent over α = β).
• A2: Both players are aware of the condition above.
• A3: P1 can calculate the optimal offer.
Following these assumptions, P2 should always accept any non-negative payoff rather than
nothing (A1) and since P1 knows that (A2), he can use backwards induction (A3) and offer the
smallest possible positive share, which is then accepted by P2. That is the so called Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game [13, 14].
However, as stated above, very many experiments have been performed on UG’s ([3, 4, 15–
17]), and the results differ significantly from those predicted by the arguments shown above.
Interesting enough is the fact that offers below 20 percent are very rare and they are rejected
about half of the times. Modal and median offers are usually 40-50 percent, means are 30-40
percent and there are virtually no offers above the 50 percent split [3, 10]. The robustness of
this results has also been tested under cross-cultural perspectives [18]. If we are willing to use
game theory as a theoretical framework to explain these results, we must therefore admit that
the assumptions from which we derived the previous equilibrium do not correspond with the
behaviour of actual players. Clearly, A1 is proved wrong when confronted with the experimen-
tal results, since P2 does not always prefer a positive payoff rather than a zero payoff. The fact
that proposers do offer more than the minimum possible implies that they do not follow A2,
and hence do not think of others as pure income-maximizers. Given these circumstances it is
reasonable to discard as well A3 on the basis that the idea of an optimal offer is ill-defined. In
fact, although P1may try to estimate what his best strategy should be, it is impossible for him
to find it if both A1 and A2 are not true.
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In what follows, we show how an approach based on a simple description of emotions offers
insights on the observed behavior which, importantly, can not be obtained from alternative
descriptions introduced earlier. In order to present our results, the remainder of the manu-
script is organized as follows: first, we critically review the available theories proposed to under-
stand behavior that is not well described by the axioms above. Subsequently, we present our
model, starting from the implementation of the description of emotions to proceed to the cor-
responding utility function. We then study our model in detail, obtaining general results and
examples arising from specific choices for the model parameters. We conclude with a discus-
sion of our results in view of the available evidence and of the pre-existing theories.
1 Earlier work
As we indicated above, the robustness of the experimental results has encouraged the develop-
ment of several different models. Among these, we will briefly review here those that can be
connected to emotions in one way or another, in order to properly frame the contributions of
our own approach. Let us begin by discussing the paper by Fehr and Schmidt [10] who, in
1999, proposed a general model (A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation) in
which they included other-regarding preferences in the utility function. For the two-player ver-
sion of this model, they define player i’s utility for the allocation x = {xi, xj} as:
UiðxÞ ¼ xi  ai max ðxj  xi; 0Þ  bi max ðxi  xj; 0Þ; i 6¼ j
where they assume that βi αi and 0 βi < 1.
The choice β 0 is based on the not-self-evident assumption that nobody likes to be better
off than the others, while β< 1 implies that a player is not willing to throw away money in
order to reduce his advantage relative to other player. Parameters α and β can be understood as
envy and guilt weights respectively. Indeed, the former reduces utility when the other player’s
payoff is greater than one’s payoff, while the latter reduces utility if the focal player’s payoff is
greater than the other’s. In the characterization of the parameters, the assumption α β
implies that players suffermore from inequality that is to her disadvantage, and less if it is to
her advantage. In our understanding of this approach, it appears that the introduction of these
parameters is motivated by how players react emotionally to different allocations. Under this
perspective the model represents players’ choices as a combination of income maximization
moderated by an emotional rejection (aversion) to inequality. However, there is no explanation
for the mechanism behind this reaction, and each individual is characterized by her envy and
guilt parameters without further connection to her emotional mechanisms at work. Notice also
that in this model players are not able to know accurately what the preferences of others are, in
so far as they don’t know the value of their parameters. For that reason, proposers have to over-
come several problems in order to estimate an optimal offer. For instance, she must assume
that the other player is also influenced by envy and guilt (although in an unknown way) and try
to estimate herminimum acceptable offer (MAO) with this incomplete information.
A different approach was proposed by Rabin [9], who developed a theory of fairness equilib-
ria for two-player games in normal form. His model is motivated by the fact that people behave
nicely to those who treat them nicely and punish those who are not nice to them, with both
motivations having a greater effect on behavior as the material cost of sacrificing becomes
smaller. Such model includes a representation of subjective judgements and beliefs of the play-
ers, based on the psychological games framework of Geanakoplos [19]. In order to analyze this
model [3] [20], let ai be the strategy chosen by player i, bj player i’s belief about the strategy
chosen by player j, and ci player i’s belief about the player j’s belief about the strategy chosen by
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player i. Then, the utility function (social preference) is defined as:
Uiðai; bj; ciÞ ¼ piðai; bjÞ þ ~f jðbj; ciÞ þ ~f jðbj; ciÞfiðai; bjÞ
where πi(ai, bj) is the monetary payoff to player i, fiðai; bjÞ ¼ ðpjðbj; aiÞ  pfairj ðbjÞÞ=ðpmaxj ðbjÞ 
pminj ðbjÞÞ is player i’s kindness toward player j, ~f jðbj; ciÞ ¼ ðpiðci; bjÞ  pfairi ðciÞÞ=ðpmaxi ðciÞ 
pmin1 ðc1ÞÞ is the perceived kindness by player i with respect to how she is being treated by player
j, pmaxj ðbjÞ and pminj ðbjÞ are respectively the highest and lowest possible payoffs for player j, and
pfairj ðbjÞ is an equitable fair payoff deﬁned as the average of the highest and lowest payoffs.
In order to make the model more tractable and define a fairness equilibrium, Rabin assumes
that players are willing to maximize their social utilities and that all higher-order beliefs match
actual behavior (i.e ai = bj = ci) [3]. Again, from our viewpoint such an equilibrium concept is
built upon the emotional response of the players (how kindly they feel they are treated) and the
assumption that players know with certainty the beliefs of other players, what seems very unre-
alistic in our opinion. Much like in the discussion above, this model lacks a description and
characterization of the mechanisms behind the emotional responses. It is also important to
note the intuitive idea of a fair payoff being defined as the average of the maximum and mini-
mum, as this point will become relevant later in our discussion.
Finally, another, more recent approach that explicitly points to emotions in the develop-
ment of an utility function is that of Cox et al [20]. They include a parameter θ(r, s) to represent
the emotional state of a given player, as the willingness to pay own for other’s payoff at an allo-
cation on the equal line xi = xj. It is introduced as an increasing function on both reciprocity (r)
and the status (s), and they assume it to be identical across individuals except for a mean zero
idiosyncratic term. The utility for the allocation x = {xi, xj} is then defined as:
uiðxÞ
(¼ ðxai þ yxaj Þ=a if a 2 ð1; 0Þ [ ð0; 1
¼ xixyj if a ¼ 0
where α is a parameter to be determined experimentally. Once the authors treat the emotion as
a function θ(r, s) they are forced to make further assumptions on how reciprocity and status
are introduced. It seems unnecessary then to call such a variable emotional state, since it
remains unclear what the role and mechanism of actual emotions are. Indeed the inﬂuence
arises from both r and s, and any inclusion of the term emotion appears somewhat artiﬁcial and
is not necessarily related to any particular theory of emotions. Furthermore, the assumption
that θ(r, s) is identical across individuals seems to be very strong and not very realistic.
2 Model
2.1 Motivation and framework
As we have seen, emotions play a role in the arguments behind different models and explana-
tions of the experimental results. However, none of the models presented so far makes explicit
such role in a clear manner. Indeed, the idea that the decision-making process is influenced by
emotions is very intuitive. There is also experimental evidence of emotional reactions to unfair
offers as measured by skin conductance [21], and of how unfair offers elicit activity in brain
areas related to both emotion (anterior insula) and cognition (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex)
[22]. In these and many other studies, it is also clear that if the emotion is perceived as negative
(anger, frustration, sadness, etc.); as a consequence, it is more likely for a given offer to be
rejected [23] [24]. Thus, it seems reasonable to try to understand behavior in UG as a
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combination of both emotion and cognition, allowing one to explain the experimental results
from that departure point.
One of the main contributors to the idea of two different but interacting systems in deci-
sion-making processes is nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman [25] [26]. Kahneman posits that
such mechanism is governed by the interaction of two different systems, which he calls System
1 and System 2. Processes of System 1 are regarded as fast, effortless, automatic, associative and
emotionally charged. System 2, in contrast, is responsible for processes that are slow, con-
trolled, analytical, cognitively demanding and affect free. He suggests four ways in which a
judgement or choice may be made [25]:
1. no intuitive response comes to mind, and the judgement is produced by System 2.
2. an intuitive judgement or intention is evoked, and
a. is endorsed by System 2;
b. serves as an anchor for adjustments that respond to other features of the situation;
c. is identified as incompatible with a subjectively valid rule, and blocked from overt
expression.
In the context of our attempt to explicitly account for the influence of emotions on behavior,
a relevant point is that experimental results show that the average is an easily accesible quantity
to System 1 [26]. It is thus tempting to suggest that in an UG, System 1 would rapidly perceive
the even split as a benchmark and then trigger an emotional reaction according to the subjec-
tive validity (or fairness) of it. System 2 analysis would then correspond to that of a pure
income-maximizer player. Interestingly, as discussed above, the average payoff appears as a
measure of fairness in Rabin’s approach [9].
Having found a reasonable starting point for our model, the next step towards defining it is
to be able to manipulate the concept of emotion. To that end, we rely on the so called Circum-
plex Model [27], in which emotions can be categorized in two different continuous dimensions:
valence and arousal. Valence indicates whether the pleasure related to an emotion is either pos-
itive or negative, while arousal indicates the personal activity induced by that emotion. This
emotion model has been used, for instance, by Schweitzer et al. [28] to build an agent-based
model of collective emotions in online communities, yielding results resembling actually
observed behavior. Fig 1 shows how different emotions may be classified according to this
model.
2.2 Utility function
In the preceding subsection, we have summarized the two main building blocks of our model.
We now move on to its definition by considering the requirements that an utility function
should satisfy in order to account for the experimental results, from the viewpoint that the
decision making process might be driven by a combination of both emotional and cognitive
processes. Therefore, we would like to introduce a model that includes the next facts:
1. Emotions are triggered when offers differ from the perceived average (System 1).
2. The decision making process is a combination of cognitive (System 2) and emotional (Sys-
tem 1) impulses.
3. If a negative emotion (as represented by its valence) is triggered then players are willing to
give money away in order to compensate for that emotion (as quantified by its arousal).
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4. Explanatory mechanisms must be compatible with the four ways suggested by Kahneman
in which a judgement or choice may be made.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the total amount to be split is equal to one, and
let xi and xj be the proportions of that amount corresponding to each player (xi + xj = 1). Our
proposal for player i’s utility for an allocation x = {xi, xj} is given by
uiðxÞ ¼ xi þ ðxi; li; tiÞ ð1Þ
with
ðxi; li; tiÞ ¼ vðxÞ  aðxi; li; tiÞ ð2Þ
Fig 1. Graphical representation of the circumplex model of emotions. The vertical axis corresponds to
the arousal dimension and the horizontal one to the valence. Each point on the plane represents an emotional
state. Sources: [27] [29].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158733.g001
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where
vðxÞ ¼ sign xi 
1
2
 
¼
1 if xi < 1=2
0 if xi ¼ 1=2
1 if xi > 1=2
8>><
>>:
aðxi; li; tiÞ ¼ liY½j2xi  1j  ti ¼
(
0 if j2xi  1j <= ti
li if j2xi  1j > ti
and
0 <= li <= 1; 0 <= ti <= 1
Let us now discuss in detail the ingredients of our model. To begin with, the function
(xi; λ, τ) represents how an emotion, triggered by the allocation x, influences the perceived
utility of a player. It can be separated in the product of two quantities; the valence, v(x), and the
arousal, a(x; λ, τ). In agreement with the previously seen Circumplex Model, the former deter-
mines whether the emotion is perceived as either positive or negative, and the latter gives
account of its intensity in a scale determined by the total amount to be split. Furthermore, the
emotion is negative if the amount to consider is less than that of an equal split, and viceversa.
The reason behind this choice is that, as we already mentioned, the “average” (the even split in
this case) is cognitively easy to evaluate according to Kahneman’s findings [25] [26], and so we
take deviations from this pre-stablished value as the baseline to test in which direction may the
emotion triggered influence the perceived utility. On the other hand, the arousal a(x; λ, τ) is
formulated in terms of a Heaviside function that captures the idea of how this biased thinking
may ultimately affect the decision or not. As we have defined it, it implies that deviations from
the average must be greater than a parameter τ (characteristic of each individual) in order to let
the emotion affect the decision making process.
Within the approach we have just introduced, if no emotion is triggered the judgement is
entirely determined by System 2. In case that emotions are triggered, this might be enough or
not to overcome a purely rational decision. Indeed, if the emotion finally influences the utility
function it does so according to parameter λ (characteristic of each individual), which is mea-
sured as a percentage of the total economic welfare. Notice that, in contrast with earlier models,
this utility function includes emotions as characterized by a psychological model, and its possi-
ble outcomes match those suggested by Kahneman.
3 Results
3.1 General analysis
We are now in a position to start analyzing the game described by our model. To that end, we
follow a modified set of assumptions:
• A1’: Players behave as utility-maximizers, and therefore they prefer α to β whenever u(α)> u
(β) (and they are indifferent over u(α) = u(β)).
• A2’: Both players are aware of the condition above.
• A3’: P1 uses some heuristic to guess P2’s preferences and thus calculate her optimal offer.
We note that the first two assumptions are the same as before, only, in the case of A1’,
referred to our new utility function. The main difference with the previous framework is then
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that, even if both players want to maximize their respective utilities (and both know that), P1
has to guess what the MAO of P2might be. In order to estimate the MAO of a given player, we
believe that a reasonable approach is to find the value for which her utility is minimum but
non-negative. From Eq (1) it is immediate to show that ui(xi < 1/2)< ui(xi 1/2), so we must
seek for the minimum in offers less than the even split. We are therefore left with:
uiðxiÞ ¼
(
xi  li if xi 2 ½0; ð1 tiÞ=2Þ
xi if xi 2 ½ð1 tiÞ=2; 1=2Þ
ð3Þ
and, since we are constrained to non-negative utilities, the MAO turns out to be given by:
xMAOi ¼ min ðð1 tiÞ=2; liÞ < 1=2 ð4Þ
Hence, it is a dominant strategy for the responder to accept any offer s >= xMAO2 and to reject
it if s < xMAO2 . If, on the other hand, the proposer knows the preferences of the responder
(given by λ2 and τ2) he will offer (in equilibrium):
s ¼ xMAO2
In this scenario, nobody has complete information about the possible reactions of other players
(A’3). Therefore, we proceed to analyze an stylized case. If the proposer does not know the pref-
erences of the responder but believes that P2’s preferences are the same as hers, she will offer
s1 ¼ xMAO1 ¼ min ðð1 t1Þ=2; l1Þ: ð5Þ
Under the assumptions above, the game is uniquely determined by the distribution of
parameters f(λ, τ). In fact, Eq (5) can be seen as a transformation of the stochastic variables λ
and τ, and the offer’s distribution, p(s), can be calculated using that [30]
pðsÞ ¼
Z 1
0
dt
Z 1
0
f ðl; tÞdðs min ðl; ð1 tÞ=2ÞÞdl ð6Þ
where δ(x) is Dirac’s delta function. Further calculations show that
pðsÞ ¼
Z 1
0
dt
Z 1t
2
0
f ðl; tÞdðl sÞdlþ 2
Z 1
0
dt
Z 1
1t
2
f ðl; tÞdðt ð1 2sÞÞdl
¼
Z 12s
0
f ðs; tÞdtþ 2
Z 1
s
f ðl; 1 2sÞdl
ð7Þ
Therefore, for any given distribution of parameters f(λ, τ) we can find the corresponding
distribution of offers using Eq (7). The same expression also allows us to obtain the probability
that an offer 0< s 0.5 is accepted using the cumulative distribution function: as any player
would accept offers greater than her MAO, we have
PðsÞ ¼
Z s
0
pðrÞdr ð8Þ
The proposer’s expected outcome for a given offer s, g(s), is subsequently given by
gðsÞ ¼ ð1 sÞPðsÞ ð9Þ
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and the offer which maximizes the expected payoff of the proposer, s, is
dgðsÞ
ds
¼ 0 ) s ð10Þ
We can take the analysis beyond this point by assuming that the variables λ and τ are inde-
pendent. In this case, we can write f(λ, τ) = fΛ(λ)fT(τ), and Eq (1) becomes
pðsÞ ¼ fLðsÞ
Z 12s
0
fTðtÞdtþ 2fTð1 2sÞ
Z 1
s
fLðlÞdl
¼ fLðsÞFTð1 2sÞ þ 2fTð1 2sÞð1 FLðsÞÞ
ð11Þ
where FΛ,T(x) are the corresponding cumulative distribution functions. In the particular case
that both parameters follow the same distribution f(x), the former equation can be cast in the
form
pðsÞ ¼ d
ds
ðFð1 2sÞðFðsÞ  1ÞÞ ð12Þ
from which we easily obtain:
PðsÞ ¼ Fð1 2sÞðFðsÞ  1Þ þ 1 ð13Þ
This is the most general result we can obtain (within the assumption of independence of λ
and τ). In the following subsection, we consider specific examples to assess the ability of our
model to explain the observations from experiments.
3.2 Examples
In order to illustrate some applications of the previous equations, we use two different distribu-
tions for the parameters λ and τ: a uniform distribution on the interval λ, τ 2 [0, 1], and a nor-
mal distribution N [1/2, 1/6]. In the second example the standard deviation is chosen in a way
that 99.73% of the values are in the range [0, 1]. With this choice, we neglect any effects pro-
duced by values outside the allowed range for our parameters. In both cases, the fact that the
distributions are the same for both λ and τ, allows us to use Eqs (12) and (13). It has to be
stressed that we do not aim at exactly fitting experimental data, but only to show that the
model does indeed yield reasonable results as well as to illustrate how, once a distribution for
the parameters is obtained, specific predictions arise. Table 1 summarizes the results arising
from the two distributions mentioned above in comparison with some robust experimental
data [3]:
Table 1. Examples and comparison of results with different distributions.
Uniform Gaussian Experimental
Modal offer * 0% 25% 40-50%
Median offer 19% 24% 40-50%
Mean offer 21% 24% 30-40%
Offers in range 1-10% 28% 4% * 0%
Offers in range 50-100% * 0% * 0% * 0%
Rejection of offers in range 40-50% 6% 1% * 0%
Rejection of offers in range 1-20% 48% 70% 50%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158733.t001
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As can be immediately seen, the results arising from the uniform distribution exhibit a few
important discrepancies with the experimental results, namely the modal offer and the percent-
age of low offers. On the other hand, the Gaussian distribution gives qualitatively correct
results, its main difficulty being the large amount of rejections below 20% of the pot. We note
that the rejection of offers in range 40-50% has been estimated as the proportion of individuals
that would only accept offers greater than 45%. Notwithstanding the general satisfactory agree-
ment, particularly for the Gaussian distribution, it is evident that in both cases modal, median
and mean offers are quantitatively incorrect, lower than those obtained experimentally. This
could be at least potentially corrected in an evolutionary framework. In fact, if we apply Eq
(10) to find the predicted optimal offer we get 39% for the uniform distribution and 23% for
the gaussian. For the uniform distribution, the optimal offer is much higher than the modal,
median and mean offers reported in Table 1. In this case, if we consider an evolutionary version
of the game, it is clearly possible that the population gets closer to the experimentally observed
values, because players using the optimal offer would perform better. On the other hand, the
optimal offer for the gaussian distribution is already very close to the central offer values, and
therefore even in an evolutionary framework it should not change much.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced a novel manner to account for the influence of emotions on
economic decision-making through a modified utility function. In contrast with previous
approaches [9, 10, 20], our framework includes explicitly emotional contributions in the utility
function expressed in terms of valence and arousal, i.e., following the Circumplex model [27]
and making contact with Kahneman’s two-system approach [26]. In our model, valence, the
positive or negative charge of the emotion, arises from the way the action of one’s counterpart
is perceived, and arousal requires a significant deviation from the expected or desired behavior
before emotions take over pure rationality. While we have focused for definiteness on the Ulti-
matum game, the same ideas can apply to any other game or economic interaction and there-
fore our proposal is a general one.
In the specific context of the UG, our model is amenable to analytical study and we have
thus provided general results for the players’ behavior that depend only on the distribution of
our two emotional parameters in the population. In order to illustrate the results arising from
our approach, we have chosen two very simple case studies, given by a uniform distribution
and a Gaussian one. The uniform distribution does not provide good results, although this is
not unexpected because it allows for very different emotional motivations and consequences in
the population. The Gaussian distribution already gives qualitatively correct results compared
to the experiments, albeit it underestimates the offers and the acceptance levels. It goes without
saying that, were more specific information on the possible distributions of the emotional
parameters in the population, they could be immediately inserted in our results to obtain spe-
cific predictions about the observed behavior. Interestingly, the model predicts that the choice
of an amount to split would influence the outcomes if it changes from those typically used (5,
10, etc.) to some other numbers “difficult to average” (i.e 137).
As we have already said, the model presented is a first approach, trying to capture different
ideas in decision-making processes and the role emotions play in them. It includes what we
believe are the main stylized facts, although it could be enhanced in several different ways to fit
experimental data in a more general theory yet to come. It would also be useful to study the
application of these ideas to other games to check the validity and accuracy of the correspond-
ing predictions, thus allowing to better understand the influence of emotions in strategic inter-
actions. To be sure, this is a quite subtle and complex problem. Trying to mathematically
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formalize a theory of emotions seems like a daunting task, but having some insights that help
us to understand human behavior can be a more achievable goal. In order to test the validity of
the model, the first thing that needs to be done is to determine the distribution of parameters
(which should be independent of the game), and test whether it is robust or not. The increasing
interest in measuring emotional reactions [31] in different situations is a great opportunity to
do so. In fact, if the ideas presented here match experimental data, the extension of the model
to other games and situations would be the definitive test.
Finally, a key point in obtaining Eqs (5)–(13) is the assumption that the proposer thinks of
others as if they were like himself. This heuristic facilitates the analytical calculations, and
serves as a first approximation to the problem. As has been pointed out, it is not possible for a
player to have complete information on the other players in models that include parametric
descriptions of individuals. A more realistic approach would take into account the history of
the player in former interactions as a proxy of how others may behave. We hope that this work
facilitates further research along these directions.
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